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Abstract
In this paper, we study a security problem on a simple wiretap network, consisting of a source node S, a destination node D,
and an intermediate node R. The intermediate node connects the source and the destination nodes via a set of noiseless parallel
channels, with sizes n1 and n2, respectively. A message M is to be sent from S to D. The information in the network may be
eavesdropped by a set of wiretappers. The wiretappers cannot communicate with one another. Each wiretapper can access a subset
of channels, called a wiretap set. All the chosen wiretap sets form a wiretap pattern. A random key K is generated at S and a coding
scheme on (M,K) is employed to protect M . We define two decoding classes at D: In Class-I, only M is required to be recovered
and in Class-II, both M and K are required to be recovered. The objective is to minimize H(K)/H(M) for a given wiretap
pattern under the perfect secrecy constraint. The first question we address is whether routing is optimal on this simple network.
By enumerating all the wiretap patterns on the Class-I/II (3, 3) networks and harnessing the power of Shannon-type inequalities,
we find that gaps exist between the bounds implied by routing and the bounds implied by Shannon-type inequalities for a small
fraction (< 2%) of all the wiretap patterns. The second question we investigate is the following: What is minH(K)/H(M) for
the remaining wiretap patterns where gaps exist? We study some simple wiretap patterns and find that their Shannon bounds (i.e.,
the lower bound induced by Shannon-type inequalities) can be achieved by linear codes, which means routing is not sufficient
even for the (3, 3) network. For some complicated wiretap patterns, we study the structures of linear coding schemes under the
assumption that they can achieve the corresponding Shannon bounds. The study indicates that the determination of the entropic
region of 6 linear vector spaces cannot be sidestepped. Some subtle issues on the network models are discussed and interesting
observations are stated.
Index Terms
Network coding, linear network coding, entropic region, cut-set bound, routing bound, Shannon bound, wiretap network.
I. INTRODUCTION
S R D
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X2
X3
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X6
Fig. 1. The communication model with three nodes and six noiseless channels
A. A Security Problem on a Simple Communication Network
In this paper, we study a security problem on a communication network (depicted in Fig. 1) with three nodes S, R, and D,
where S is the source node, R is the intermediate node, and D is the destination node, respectively. There are three noiseless
channels connecting the pairs (S, R) and (R, D).
A private message M is generated at S and is to be sent to D. As there is a collection of wiretappers that can only tap
the information on a subset of the channels, a random key K which is independent of M is also generated at node S. To
protect the message M , a coding scheme whose encoders take as inputs both M and K is employed to combat the effect of
the wiretappers. This coding scheme ensures that the information read by each wiretapper is independent of M . Furthermore,
wiretappers cannot communicate with one another. For each wiretapper, the set of channels it accesses, called a wiretap set,
is fixed before the coding scheme on (M,K) is constructed. The set of all the wiretap sets is called a wiretap pattern. Now,
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2a fundamental question arises: If we fix the size of the message, what is the minimum size of the key should be injected to
protect the message? Here the “size” of a random variable is measured by its entropy. The problem we stated does not seem to
be very hard since the network topology is simple and a simpler version of this problem dates back to Shannon [6]. However,
as we shall show in this paper, this problem appears to be fiendishly hard. Even for such a simple network, the problem is
challenging to solve completely.
B. Related Results
1) Network Coding: We leverage two important concepts in this paper, namely, routing and network coding. In most
communication networks, information is transmitted in a store-and-forward manner; i.e., bits are delivered as commodities
and then are routed from a node to another. The bits are unaltered on the transmission paths. Ahlswede et al. [1] proposed
a network communication paradigm called network coding, where the role of the intermediate nodes is enhanced as follows.
At each intermediate node, the information received on the input channels may be encoded, and may be sent on the output
channels. Network coding can increase the achievable rates and even attain the capacity of the network. In [1], the classical
max-flow-min-cut theorem is generalized to multicast scenario. Furthermore, the authors demonstrated that network coding
can outperform store-and-forward in terms of bandwidth utilization. Routing is a class of special network coding schemes.
Indeed, when network coding is used, the information is coded in the network. We refer the reader to Yeung et al. [2] for a
comprehensive treatment of network coding theory.
2) Information-Theoretic Security and Wiretap Networks: Information-theoretic security was launched in Shannon’s seminal
work [6], where the communication model is only a single channel. A key K is stored at the sender and receiver before the
message M is sent. The sender generates X from M and K by an encoding function. Then X is sent through the channel. The
receiver decodes M from X and K . The main result, called the perfect secrecy theorem, implies that the size of K (measured
by its entropy) is lower bounded by the size of M .
In wiretap networks, Cai and Yeung [3] considered sending a private message to possibly more than one receiver through a
noiseless communication network. Their model is as follows: The communication may be eavesdropped by a set of wiretappers,
who cannot communicate with one another. Each of the wiretappers can access a subset of channels of the network, called
a wiretap set. The wiretapper can choose an arbitrary wiretap set before communication and the choice is fixed during
communication. The set of all the chosen wiretap sets is commonly referred to as a wiretap pattern, denoted by A. For such an
A, the sender and the legitimate users have to design a coding scheme to combat the effect of the wiretappers. The strategy is
to generate a random key K to protect the message and send both the message and the key via a network coding scheme. This
ensures that a wiretapper can only observe some functions of the message and the key, where the output of the functions are
statistically independent of the message. On the other hand, a receiver node can recover the private message by decoding the
information received from its input channels. The performance of a secure network coding scheme is measured by the sizes of
the message and the key. In designing a secure network coding scheme, the aim is to maximize the size of the message whist
minimizing the size of the key. In [3], when A consists of all subsets of channels whose sizes are at most some constant r,
there exists a linear network code which is optimal in both the sizes of the message and the key. When A is arbitrary, a cut-set
bound on the ratio of the size of the key and the size of the message was obtained in Cheng and Yeung [4, 5]. The wiretap
network model is a generalization of the well known perfect secrecy system studied by Shannon [6], and is also widely studied
from many different perspectives. A comprehensive survey of the fundamental performance limits in wiretap networks can be
found in Cai and Chan [7].
From the point of view of equivalence and complexity, Cui et al. [20] showed that determining the secrecy capacity is an
NP-hard problem for nonuniform or restricted wiretap sets. Huang et al. [21] studied the problem where network nodes can
independently generate randomness and the wiretap sets are uniform, showing that determining the secrecy capacity is at least
as difficult as the k-unicast network coding problem. More results on equivalence of network coding problems can be found
in Huang et al. [22]. We emphasize that the focus of this paper is not on determining the secrecy capacity; rather we are
concerned with finding the minimum key size relative to the message length, i.e., H(K)/H(M). Thus, we avoid the difficulties
pointed out in [20, 21]; yet we encounter a different set of difficulties.
3) Shannon- and non-Shannon-type Inequalities: The properties of Shannon information measures form a useful set of tools
to investigate the properties of wiretap networks. For a set of random variables, the properties of information measures such
as entropy, mutual information, conditional entropy are well known. In particular, it is well known that the above information
measures are non-negative. Information inequalities which can be implied by Shannon’s information measures are referred to
as Shannon-type inequalities; e.g., the inequality H(X1|X2) ≤ H(X1). If only the Shannon-type inequalities are concerned, a
one-to-one correspondence between information measures and set theory can be established in the so-called I-Measure theory
by Yeung [9, Ch. 3], which only involves simple set theory operations; i.e., union, intersection, complement, and set difference.
Moreover, the following fundamental result [9, Ch. 14] was established for the information measures:
Let [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Any Shannon’s information measures involving random variables X1, X2, . . ., Xn can be expressed
as the sum of the following two elemental forms:
(i) H(Xi|X[n]−{i}), i ∈ [n];
3(ii) I(Xi;Xj|XK), where i 6= j and K ⊆ [n]− {i, j}.
Note that all the information inequalities we studied are linear. If we regard these n+
(
n
2
)
2n−2 elements as variables, then any
information expression can be rewritten as a linear combination of them. This observation enables us to check the correctness
of a Shannon-type inequality by transforming it into an equivalent linear program, which can be easily implemented in a
computer program. ITIP [10] and Xitip [11] are two widely used software packages based on this very principle, where the
latter is an upgraded version of the former. When a certain information inequality and some constraints are supplied as inputs
to the software program, it will inform the user whether the information inequality is a valid Shannon-type inequality. The
latest extensions of ITIP may be found in Tian [12] and Ho et al. [13].
It was a long-standing problem as to whether there exist inequalities involving information measures that cannot be directly
implied by Shannon-type inequalities. This was before the seminal work by Zhang and Yeung [14], where the first non-
Shannon-type inequality was proved. All the information inequalities on n random variables characterize the so-called entropic
region Γ¯∗n [9]. Note that the I-Measure-based method is futile for proving non-Shannon-type inequalities. In Dougherty et al.
[15], the inequality in [14] was used to reduce the capacity bound in a communication network, indicating that Shannon-type
inequalities are not always sufficient in practice. The general theory of non-Shannon-type inequalities is still in its infancy
and relatively little progress has been achieved. So far, the problem has been addressed when the number of random variables
n ≤ 3. When all the random variables are in one-to-one correspondences with vector spaces, the problem has been settled for
n ≤ 5 in Dougherty et al. [16]. For the case n = 6, Dougherty [17] showed that the number of different linear rank inequalities
exceeds 1 million. The exact set of linear rank inequalities is still unknown.
4) Network Coding meets Information Inequalities: In essence, network coding problems can be perfectly represented by the
aforementioned information measures. We can use random variables to denote the information transmitted on the channels. The
encoding and decoding process at each node can be dealt by information equalities. The performance bounds of network coding
can be expressed via information inequalities. It was proved in Chan and Grant [18] that the general secure network coding
problem on multi-source and multi-sink network is as hard as determining the exact entropic region. That is, the general secure
network coding problem is hard to solve. Thus, we seek bounds. We may consider only Shannon-type inequalities to obtain a
bound on a concrete problem by solving the corresponding linear program, or invoking some I-Measure-based softwares; e.g.,
ITIP or Xitip. In the sequel, we refer to the bound obtained by Shannon-type inequalities as the Shannon bound. However, the
I-Measure-based method suffers from the drawback that the computational complexity is exponential in the number of random
variables, which means it works well only for very few random variables. Fortunately, we may also consider the cut-set bound,
which is a classic tool in analyzing the performance of network coding. In some situations, the cut-set bound is tight; e.g., the
bound obtained in [3].
C. The Problem We Study and The Question We Ask
Network coding trumps routing in many aspects of communication scenarios. However, routing is advantageous over network
coding due to its lower complexity in encoding and decoding and it is easy to understand and analyze. In some simple networks,
in lieu of network coding, routing can be shown to be sufficient. In the wiretap network, the only easily-computable bounds
are the cut-set bound and Shannon bound. The cut-set bound is optimal for the point-to-point communication system. If we
consider only routing in the network, we can transform the general network model to a point-to-point network, which means
we can obtain a bound based on routing. Here we refer to it as the routing bound. For a point-to-point communication network,
all these three bounds are tight; while for general networks, none of them is tight in general. The main motivation of this work
is from the following fundamental question:
Can we systematically assess the tightness of these bounds in a marginally more complex network compared to a
point-to-point network?
D. Main Contribution and Techniques
In this paper, we assess the optimality of routing in the wiretap network with a simple topology (Fig. 1). Recall that in [4, 5],
the cut-set bound is tight for a point-to-point communication system. Beyond the cut-set bound, no further result has been
known till date and it is not clear to what extent, the routing scheme is optimal. Our network model is more complex since
there is an extra encoding node. It is interesting to deduce whether routing is optimal. In this paper, we use ITIP/Xitip to
compare the routing bound, the cut-set bound, and the Shannon bound for different wiretap patterns. We find out that for some
wiretap patterns, there are gaps between the routing bounds and the Shannon bounds. We pick some examples from these
wiretap patterns with gaps, and construct coding schemes to achieve the Shannon bounds. Hence, one of the main takeaways
is that the routing bound is not tight even in this simple network. For some concrete wiretap patterns where gaps exist, we
discuss linear coding schemes to achieve the Shannon bounds. Furthermore, two different decoding classes are defined and the
distinction between them is discussed.
We summarize our key contributions in this paper: Firstly, we enumerate all the possible wiretap patterns and determine
the wiretap patterns where gaps between Shannon bounds and routing bounds exist. Secondly, for some wiretap patterns, we
4construct coding schemes to show that routing is not optimal. Lastly, we study some complex wiretap patterns and present
linear coding scheme for these patterns. By doing so, we gain an intuitive understanding of why the Shannon bound is, in
general, difficult to attain in this simple network. We make several interesting observations during the course of our numerical
study. We also discuss some interesting problems inspired by the study.
E. Paper Organization
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the problem formulation is stated and some related results are discussed.
In Section III-A, we explain how the experiments are conducted and discuss the results. From Section III-B to Section III-E,
we select some wiretap patterns to further validate our claims. In Section IV, we study two hard wiretap patterns and the
structures of linear coding schemes to achieve the Shannon bounds. We conclude the paper in Section V by summarizing our
key contributions and stating directions for further work.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The general problem formulation is described as follows (depicted in Fig. 2):
S R D
X1,1
X1,2
X1,n1
X2,1
X2,2
X2,n2
Fig. 2. The general communication model
1. The network consists of three nodes, the source node S, the intermediate node R, and the destination node D. There are
noiseless directed edges (channels) connecting the pairs (S, R) and (R, D). Denote the set of channels by E . Let n1 be the
number of channels from S to R and n2 be the number of channels from R to D, respectively. To simplify our discussion,
we assume that the capacity of each channel is much larger than the sum of information rates.
2. Let M and K be the finite alphabets of the message M and the key K , respectively. At the source node S, a pair of
uniformly distributed message and private key (M,K) is generated, where M ∈ M is the message and K ∈ K is the
private key. It is assumed that M and K are statistically independent; i.e.,
I(M ;K) = 0. (1)
3. Denote the information transmitted on the channels from S to R by X1,1, X1,2, ..., X1,n1 . Then
H(X1,1, X1,2, ..., X1,n1 |M,K) = 0. (2)
All the above X1,i’s belong to the finite alphabets X1,i’s for 1 ≤ i ≤ n1.
4. Denote the information transmitted on the channels from R to D by X2,1, X2,2, ..., X2,n2 . Then
H(X2,1, X2,2, ..., X2,n2 |X1,1, X1,2, ..., X1,n1) = 0. (3)
All the above X2,i’s belong to the finite alphabets X2,i’s for 1 ≤ i ≤ n2. Note that when one designs a code for the
network, s/he is allowed to not only design the random variables {(X1,i, X2,j) : i = 1, . . . , n1, j = 1, . . . , n2} but also
their finite alphabets {(X1,i,X2,j) : i = 1, . . . , n1, j = 1, . . . , n2}.
5. At the destination node D, we set two different decoding classes. The first is only M is needed to be decoded at D and
the other is that both M and K are needed to be decoded at D. We refer to these two different models as Class-I (n1, n2)
network and Class-II (n1, n2) network, respectively. Specifically, in Class-I, we have
H(M |X2,1, X2,2, ..., X2,n2) = 0; (4)
and in Class-II, we have
H(M,K|X2,1, X2,2, ..., X2,n2) = 0. (5)
6. There is a set of wiretappers, each of which can access an arbitrary subset of E . The choice of the set each wiretapper
selects is fixed before communication commences and stays the same during the process of communication. Wiretappers
cannot communicate with one another. The set of choices of the wiretappers is denote by A ⊆ 2E . In the sequel, A is
5referred to as a wiretap pattern. The sender and receiver need to consider all A ∈ A, simultaneously. For a set A ∈ A,
denote (Xe, e ∈ A) by XA. In this model, perfect secrecy is required. To be concrete,
I(M ;XA) = 0, ∀A ∈ A. (6)
7. In this work, we are interested in minimizing H(K)/H(M), given the constraints above; i.e., we are interested in finding
min
H(K)
H(M)
, for a given A.1 (7)
Specifically, if we fix the size of M , what is the minimal size of K to achieve perfect secrecy?
The encoding and decoding functions at S, R, and D should abide by the conventions in network coding theory [2]. Moreover,
the secrecy constraints (6) should be satisfied. The encoder at the sender S is
fS :M×K →
n1∏
i=1
X1,i. (8)
The encoder at node R is
fR :
n1∏
i=1
X1,i →
n2∏
i=1
X2,i. (9)
The decoder at node D is:
fI :
n2∏
i=1
X2,i →M; (Class-I) (10)
or
fII :
n2∏
i=1
X2,i →M×K. (Class-II) (11)
The Class-I model is a special case of the wiretap network introduced in [3]. In Class-I networks, the private key K may be
operated on at the intermediate node R to potentially increase the message size whilst ensuring that the message is transmissible
securely over the network. The Class-II model is applicable to the scenario where multiple messages are to be delivered to
the receivers and some non-important messages are used to protect the remaining important ones. In our model, since we
have removed the capacity constraints on the channels (capacities are assumed to be sufficiently large), it is interesting to
understand the impact of the condition that K must be recovered at the destination. In particular, we ask whether there are any
wiretap patterns for which minH(K)/H(M) is changed when the decoding requirements on K are different. The answer is,
in general, yes.
A. Cut-set bound, Routing bound, Shannon bound
First, we state the cut-set bound for an arbitrary A.
Theorem 1 ([4, 5]). Let W = {e1, e2, ..., en} be a cut-set and A ⊆ 2W be a wiretap pattern. Then
H(K)
H(M)
≥
1
max
n∑
i=1
xi − 1
, (12)
where ∑
ei∈A
xi ≤ 1, ∀ A ∈ A, (13)
and
xi ≥ 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (14)
This cut-set bound can be interpreted as follows. Since the focus is on the ratio between H(K) and H(M), we may as well
set H(K) to be 1. Let xi be the information rate on channel (represented by edge) ei, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Assume that the symbols
on the channels are mutually independent, then the constraints (13) mean that the size of the symbols in each wiretap set
cannot exceed the size of the key. Furthermore, the cut-set bound is tight for a point-to-point network and its optimality can
be achieved by a linear code. Hence, if we wish to know to what extent routing is optimal, we should consider a network with
at least three nodes. The algorithm for computing the cut-set bound is described in Alg. 1.
When routing is performed, information is transmitted from S to D without being modified or coded at R. However, to
protect the message, one needs to perform coding at S and decoding at D. Otherwise, if M is not coded along with K , then
1 In principle, “min” should be replaced by “inf”, since in general, the lower bound on H(K)/H(M) can be only attained by random variables with
countably infinite alphabets, so the constraint set is not closed. For ease of expositions, we use “min” here and in the following.
6Algorithm 1 Algorithm for computing the cut-set bound
1 Denote the number of edges in the cut-set by n and the number of wiretap sets by d. Let A be a d× n matrix.
2 If the ith wiretapper can access the jth edge, then A(i, j) = 1. Otherwise, A(i, j) = 0.
3 Let 1d be the vector with all entries equal 1. Solve the linear program: max
n∑
i=1
xi−1, s.t. Ax ≤ 1d, x ≥ 0. The reciprocal
of the optimal value is the cut-set bound.
M cannot be secure. Hence, we may assume there are n1×n2 paths/channels directly connecting S to D. Since information is
unchanged in each path, a wiretapper who can access channel e will know the information on all the paths that pass through
e. Hence we need to define a new point-to-point communication system (or cut-set) and the corresponding wiretap patterns.
The cut-set W ′ = {e′1,1, e′1,2, ..., e′n1,n2}. The corresponding wiretap pattern A
′ is constructed as follows: For each A ∈ A,
there is a corresponding A′ ∈ A′ such that A′ = {e′i,k(1 ≤ k ≤ n2) : e1,i ∈ A} ∪ {e′k,j(1 ≤ k ≤ n1) : e2,j ∈ A}. Then
the routing bound can be computed by applying the cut-set bound on W ′ and A′. According to [4, 5], if the cut-set bound is
achieved, one can also recover K from the specified coding scheme. Thus routing bounds are also the same for both Class-I
and Class-II (n1, n2) networks. The algorithm is described in Alg. 2.
Algorithm 2 Algorithm for computing the routing bound
1 Denote the number of wiretap sets by d. For ease of discussion, use 1, 2, ..., n1 and 1, 2, ..., n2 to index the edges in the
two layers of the network.
2 There are n = n1 × n2 paths in the routing scheme. All the paths are ordered as follows. If a path goes through the ith
edge in layer 1 and jth edge in layer 2 of the network, then its index is (i − 1)× n2 + j. Let A be a d× n matrix.
3 If the ith wiretapper can access the jth path, then A(i, j) = 1. Otherwise, A(i, j) = 0.
4 Let 1d be a vector with all entries equal 1. Solve the linear program: max
n∑
i=1
xi − 1, s.t. Ax ≤ 1d, x ≥ 0. The reciprocal
of the optimal value is the routing bound.
The idea of Shannon bound is from Yeung [9, Ch. 14], where the key principle is to transform the problem to a linear
program in the two elemental forms; i.e.,
(i) H(Xi|X[n]−{i}), i ∈ [n];
(ii) I(Xi;Xj|XK), where i 6= j and K ⊆ [n]− {i, j}.
The algorithm for computing Shannon bound has been already implemented in ITIP/Xitip. When we input all the constraints,
ITIP/Xitip will tell us whether H(K) ≥ cH(M) is true or false. After gradually adjusting c, the Shannon bound will be
obtained.
Intuitively, we may speculate that routing is optimal for many wiretap patterns. But it is not trivial to prove its optimality.
For Class-I/II (2, 2) networks, we can check that routing is optimal. For general (n1, n2) networks, numerical experimentations
by computer programs are preferred. For each wiretap pattern A, denote
τA = min
H(K)
H(M)
, (15)
where the minimum is taken over all coding schemes (per Sec. II). Recall that various bounds in the literature satisfy that:
Cut-set bound ≤ Shannon bound ≤ τA ≤ Linear Network Coding bound ≤ Routing bound. (16)
The linear network coding bound above is the bound when optimized over all linear network coding schemes. In principle,
if any lower bounds match any upper bounds, then τA is determined. Otherwise, further investigations must be conducted
on such wiretap patterns. In the following, we conduct computation-based experiments to study the optimality of routing in
Class-I/II networks.
III. ON THE SUB-OPTIMALITY OF ROUTING
A. Experiment
When using ITIP/Xitip to assess the optimality of routing on the Class-I/II (n1, n2) networks, we face the challenge of
having to deal with an immense computational complexity. In Class-I/II (n1, n2) networks, since the wiretap pattern A is a
subset of 2E , in essence, we need to exhaust the set of all possible wiretap patterns, whose size is 22|E| = 22n1+n2 . Therefore,
in principle, when n1 +n2 > 6, it is hard to enumerate all patterns. The other difficulty is from the computational complexity
of ITIP/Xitip, because we need to solve a linear program with
(
n1+n2+2
2
)
2n1+n2 + (n1 + n2 + 2) variables.
For a given wiretap pattern A, we may assume that no element is a subset of another element. In this manner, the number
of different wiretap patterns for the Class-I/II (n1, n2) networks can be largely reduced. For a given set P , a set V ⊆ 2P is
7called an antichain if it satisfies that for all different v1 ∈ V and v2 ∈ V , v1 6⊆ v2 and v2 6⊆ v1. The number of antichains for
a set with size n = 0, 1, 2, ..., is listed in Table I (see Sloane [19]). In light of the computational complexity, n = n1 +n2 = 6
—n— 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
# 2 3 6 20 168 7,581 7, 828, 354 2, 414, 682, 040, 998
TABLE I
THE NUMBER OF ANTICHAINS
is the limiting problem size for ITIP/Xitip based algorithm. In the following, we only focus on the symmetric case where
n1 = n2 = 3.
After reducing the problem size, we design the algorithm in Alg. 3:
Algorithm 3 Algorithm for assessing the tightness of the routing bound
Generate all the possible wiretap patterns which are antichains. For each wiretap pattern,
1. Compute the cut-set bounds on (S,R) and (R,D), respectively. Keep the larger one and denote it by l1.
2. Compute the routing bound on S → R→ D. Denote it by l2.
3. If l1 equals l2, then the routing bound is tight. And hence Shannon bound is tight too. Proceed to Step 5.
4. Compare l2 with the Shannon bound in ITIP/Xitip. If these two bounds are equal, then routing is optimal; otherwise,
there is a gap between routing bound and Shannon bound.
5. Proceed to the next wiretap pattern.
Steps 1 and 2 are used to reduce computational cost, since computing the cut-set bound is much faster than the Shannon
bound. The experiment lasted for around 3–4 days. We keep track of some records during the experiment. For almost 80%
of the wiretap patterns, the cut-set bounds match the routing bounds. In the Class-I (3, 3) network, there are around 159, 258
wiretap patterns (2% of all the wiretap patterns) where gaps between routing bounds and Shannon bounds are found. In the
Class-II (3, 3) network, there are around 32, 472 wiretap patterns (0.4% of all the wiretap patterns) where gaps exist.
When a gap is found between the routing bound and the Shannon bound, there are two cases: one is that the routing bound
is not tight, and network coding is needed; the other is that Shannon-type inequalities are not sufficient, and non-Shannon-type
inequalities should be used. Next, some wiretap patterns are analyzed to show that routing is not sufficient for the Class-I/II
(3, 3) network, and network coding is necessary to achieve minH(K)/H(M).
B. Simplification of search procedure
In the following sections, we choose some wiretap patterns to demonstrate the advantage of coding over routing, and the
distinction between the Class-I and Class-II networks. Since the problem size is small, we just use X1, . . . , X6 and e1 . . . , e6
to denote the random variables and edges. For ease of verification, we provide with the code written in Xitip and Matlab
in [23].
From existing works of the literature, we do not know whether Shannon bound is tight or linear network coding is sufficient.
However, since the network topology is simple, we may first assume that the Shannon bound is tight and linear network
codes suffice to achieve the Shannon bound. As such, we attempt to construct such a linear network code. To the best of
our knowledge, there is no systematic and well-established technique on how to achieve the Shannon bound. One possible
method is to study the structure of the optimal solution resulting from the linear program of the Shannon bound, by which
some properties about the coding scheme may be found. This approach suffers from the curse of high dimensionality of the
optimal solution. Here we provide an alternative method. Note that if we add more constraints to a linear program of the form
max cTx, s.t. Ax ≤ b, (17)
the optimal value will not be increased. If the optimal value remains the same, then we can use these additional constraints to
reduce the search space for an optimal solution. If we use this technique to study the Shannon bound, some properties about
the coding scheme may be obtained.
The first simple intuition is that if we add the following constrains into the linear programs, the Shannon bounds always
remain the same:
H(X1, X2, X3) = H(X1) +H(X2) +H(X3) (18)
H(X4, X5, X6) = H(X4) +H(X5) +H(X6) (19)
That is the random variables on the same layer are constrained to be mutually independent.
Another idea is based on the observation that for a coding scheme, the following holds:
H(X4, X5, X6|X1, X2, X3) = 0. (20)
8This relationship is rather general since the functional relationships between the random variables may be more precise; e.g.,
X4 may be a function of X1 and X2, and X3 is not involved in the coding. The exact functional relationships will be very
helpful in the construction of a linear coding scheme. Our algorithm is as follows: For each Xi (4 ≤ i ≤ 6), enumerate all
the possible functional relationships with the subsets of X1, X2, X3. Then update the functional relationship and check by
ITIP/Xitip to see whether the Shannon bound is unchanged. If so, then the functional relationship is valid and does not decrease
the optimal value of the linear program. Here we state an example to illustrate our approach.
Before doing so, let us comment about the alphabet of the underlying random variables. As we mentioned in the definition
of the code (in Section II), we are allowed to choose the alphabets. To keep the design of the codes simple, the alphabets
henceforth are kept fixed to be Fq (for some q ≥ 3) in the coding schemes we design. In the sequel, unless otherwise stated,
all the alphabets are the finite field Fq.
Example 1. In the Class-II (3, 3) network (depicted in Fig. 1), let A = {A1, A2, A3, A4, A5}, where A1 = {e2, e4, e5},
A2 = {e2, e3, e6}, A3 = {e1, e5, e6}, A4 = {e1, e3, e4}, and A5 = {e1, e2, e4, e6}. The routing bound is equal to 4. By the
following constraints, the Shannon bound is equal to 3.
I(M ;K) = 0 (21)
H(X1, X2, X3|M,K) = 0 (22)
H(X4, X5, X6|X1, X2, X3) = 0 (23)
H(M,K|X4, X5, X6) = 0 (24)
I(M ;X2, X4, X5) = 0 (25)
I(M ;X2, X3, X6) = 0 (26)
I(M ;X1, X5, X6) = 0 (27)
I(M ;X1, X3, X4) = 0 (28)
I(M ;X1, X2, X4, X6) = 0 (29)
After adding the following constraints, the Shannon bound remains the same.
H(X1, X2, X3) = H(X1) +H(X2) +H(X3) (30)
H(X4, X5, X6) = H(X4) +H(X5) +H(X6) (31)
After checking with ITIP/Xitip, we obtain these additional functional relationships:
H(X4|X1, X3) = 0 (32)
H(X5|X1, X2, X3) = 0 (33)
H(X6|X2, X3) = 0 (34)
The Shannon bound will be changed if we add
H(X1) = H(X2) = H(X3) (35)
H(X4) = H(X5) = H(X6) (36)
After checking with ITIP/Xitip, we find that the following constraints can be added without changing the Shannon bound.
H(X3) = 2H(X1) (37)
H(X1) = H(X2) (38)
H(X5) = 2H(X4) (39)
H(X4) = H(X6) (40)
From these constraints, we see that the information rates on the edges from S to R and R to D are not identical any more.
The coding scheme is constructed as follows: Split X3 into (X31, X32) and X5 into (X51, X52).
1. Independently generate three bits of key K1, K2 and K3 and one bit of message M from Fq;
2. on edge e1, X1 =M +K1 +K2 +K3;
3. on edge e2, X2 = K1;
4. on edge e3, X31 = K2 and X32 = K3;
5. at intermediate node R, (M,K1,K2,K3) can be easily recovered;
6. on edge e4, X4 = X1 +X31 = M +K1 + 2K2 +K3;
7. on edge e5, X51 = X1 +X2 +X31 =M + 2K1 + 2K2 +K3 and X52 = X1 +X2 +X32 = M + 2K1 +K2 + 2K3;
8. on edge e6, X6 = X2 +X31 = K1 +K2;
99. at the destination node D, (X1, X2, X31, X32) can be recovered by X1 = X51 − X6, X2 = X51 − X4, X31 = X6 −
X51 +X4, and X32 = X52 +X4 +X6 − 2X51, which means (M,K1,K2,K3) can also be recovered.
We now verify the security constraints.
• A1: I(M ;X2, X4, X5)
= I(M ;X2, X1 +X31, X1 +X2 +X31, X1 +X2 +X32)
= I(M ;X2, X1 +X31, X1 +X32)
= H(X2, X1 +X31, X1 +X32)−H(X2, X1 +X31, X1 +X32|M)
= H(X2, X1 +X31, X1 +X32)−H(K1,K1 + 2K2 +K3,K1 +K2 + 2K3)
= 0
• A2: I(M ;X2, X3, X6)
= I(M ;X2, X3, X2 +X31)
= I(M ;X2, X3)
= 0
• A3: I(M ;X1, X5, X6)
= I(M ;X1, X1 +X2 +X31, X1 +X2 +X32, X2 +X31)
= I(M ;X1, X2 +X31, X2 +X32)
= 0
• A4: I(M ;X1, X3, X4)
= I(M ;X1, X3, X1 +X31)
= I(M ;X1, X3)
= 0
• A5: I(M ;X1, X2, X4, X6)
= I(M ;X1, X2, X1 +X31, X2 +X31)
= I(M ;X1, X2, X31)
= 0
An interesting discovery is that, in ITIP/Xitip, if we set H(K) = 3H(M) together with (21)-(29) in the constraints, all the
relationships in (30)-(34) and (37)-(40) are true. This means that if the ratio of the size of the key and the message is fixed to
that prescribed by the Shannon bound, then several functional relationships between the constituent random variables in the
problems can be uncovered. In fact, these functional relationships can help the code designer to find an optimal linear code.
For example (30) tells us that X1, X2 and X3 must be independent in any optimal coding scheme. To the best of the authors’
knowledge, this observation has not been made in previous studies.
An algorithm based on the heuristic observation above is described in Alg. 4.
Algorithm 4 Algorithm for finding the hidden structure of coding schemes
In ITIP/Xitip, input all the constraints from the problem setting (e.g., (21)-(29)).
1. Add the Shannon bound H(K) = cH(M) in the constraints in ITIP/Xitip, where c is the Shannon bound.
2. Check whether H(X1, X2, X3) = H(X1)+H(X2)+H(X3) and H(X4, X5, X6) = H(X4)+H(X5)+H(X6) are true.
3. Check the ratios of H(X1) : H(X2) : H(X3) and H(X4) : H(X5) : H(X6). One may first find that H(X1) = c1H(X2)
and H(X1) = c2H(X3). To find c1 such that H(X1) = c1H(X2), it is equivalent to find c1 such that H(X1) ≥ c1H(X2)
and H(X1) ≤ c1H(X2), which can be checked by ITIP/Xitip.
4. Check the functional relationships between (X1, X2, X3) → (X4, X5, X6) (e.g., X4 is a function of (X1, X2) denoted
as (X1, X2)→ X4).
All the additional conditions can help us to construct an optimal linear coding scheme.
Remark 1. In principle, to design a linear network code, it suffices to associate a vector space to each channel in the (3, 3)
network. These six vector spaces can be discussed in the context of the linear entropic region of 6 vector spaces, namely, L˜6.
However, the theory of determining the structure of L˜6 is incomplete. This hampers its application to our problem.
C. Coding is necessary
Example 2. In the Class-I/II (3, 3) network (depicted in Fig. 1), consider the wiretap pattern A = {A1, A2, A3, A4}, where
A1 = {2, 3, 5}, A2 = {1, 4, 5}, A3 = {1, 3, 6}, and A4 = {2, 4, 6}. The routing bound is equal to 3. Both of the Shannon
bounds for the Class-I and Class-II settings are equal to 2. Next, we construct a code to demonstrate that 2 is optimal.
1. Independently generate two bits of key K1 and K2 and one bit of message M from Fq;
2. on edge e1, X1 = K1;
3. on edge e2, X2 = K2;
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4. on edge e3, X3 =M +K1 +K2;
5. at intermediate node R, (M,K1,K2) can be easily recovered;
6. on edge e4, X4 =M + 2K1 + 2K2;
7. on edge e5, X5 =M +K1 + 2K2;
8. on edge e6, X6 =M + 2K1 +K2;
9. at the destination node D, (M,K1,K2) can be recovered by M = 2(X5+X6)−3X4, K1 = X4−X5, and K2 = X4−X6.
We now verify the security constraints.
• A1: I(X2, X3, X5;M)
= H(X2, X3, X5)−H(X2, X3, X5|M)
= H(K2,M +K1 +K2,M +K1 + 2K2)
−H(K2,M +K1 +K2,M +K1 + 2K2|M)
= H(K2,M +K1)−H(K2,K1|M)
= 0
• A2: I(X1, X4, X5;M)
= H(X1, X4, X5)−H(X1, X4, X5|M)
= H(K1,M + 2K1 + 2K2,M +K1 + 2K2)
−H(K1,M + 2K1 + 2K2,M +K1 + 2K2|M)
= H(K1,M + 2K2)−H(K1,K2|M)
= 0
• A3: I(X1, X3, X6;M)
= H(X1, X3, X6)−H(X1, X3, X6|M)
= H(K1,M +K1 +K2,M + 2K1 +K2)
−H(K1,M +K1 +K2,M + 2K1 +K2|M)
= H(K1,M +K2)−H(K1,K2|M)
= 0
• A4: I(X2, X4, X6;M)
= H(X2, X4, X6)−H(X2, X4, X6|M)
= H(K2,M + 2K1 + 2K2,M + 2K1 +K2)
−H(K2,M + 2K1 + 2K2,M + 2K1 +K2|M)
= H(K2,M + 2K1)−H(K2,K1|M)
= 0
Remark 2. To design a secure linear coding scheme, one needs to design Xi, i = 1, ..., 6, such that X1, X2, and X3 are
mutually independent and X4, X5, and X6 are also mutually independent. Since we have two bits for the key and one bit for
the message, the information rates in a wiretap set cannot exceed two bits. On one hand, to reduce the size of key, observe
from the wiretap set A1 that we need to ensure that X5 is a function of X2 and X3. On the other hand, since (X1, X2, X3) is
recoverable from (X4, X5, X6), the information rates of X4, X5, X6 should be 3. There should be a trade-off between these
two constraints, which may make routing sub-optimal.
D. Distinction between Class-I and Class-II Networks
Example 3. In this example, we show that for the same network topology and wiretap pattern, the routing bound is tight for
the Class-II network while it is loose for the Class-I network. Consider the wiretap pattern A = {A1, A2, A3, A4}, where
A1 = {1, 4}, A2 = {2, 3, 4}, A3 = {1, 2, 5, 6}, and A4 = {3, 5, 6}. The routing bound is 3. The Shannon bound in Class-I
network is 2 and in Class-II network is 3. Next, we construct a code to show that 2 is optimal for the Class-I network.
1. Independently generate two bits of key K1 and K2 and one bit of message M from Fq;
2. on edge e1, X1 =M +K1;
3. on edge e2, X2 = K2;
4. on edge e3, X3 = K1;
5. it is easy to see at intermediate node R, (M,K1,K2) can be recovered.
6. on edge e4, X4 = K1 +K2;
7. on edge e5, X5 =M +K1 +K2;
8. on edge e6, transmit nothing;
9. at the destination node D, M can be recovered by M = X5 −X4, K1 and K2 cannot be recovered.
We now verify the security constraints.
• A1: I(X1, X4;M)
= H(X1, X4)−H(X1, X4|M)
= H(M +K1,K1 +K2)−H(M +K1,K1 +K2|M)
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= H(M +K1,K1 +K2)−H(K1,K2|M)
= 0
• A2: I(X2, X3, X4;M)
= I(K2,K1,K1 +K2;M)
= 0
• A3: I(X1, X2, X5, X6;M)
= H(X1, X2, X5, X6)−H(X1, X2, X5, X6|M)
= H(M +K1,K2,M +K1 +K2)
−H(M +K1,K2,M +K1 +K2|M)
= H(M +K1,K2)−H(K1,K2|M)
= 0
• A4: I(X3, X5, X6;M)
= H(X3, X5, X6)−H(X3, X5, X6|M)
= H(K1,M +K1 +K2)−H(K1,M +K1 +K2|M)
= H(K1,M +K2)−H(K1,K2|M)
= 0
E. Sub-optimality of routing in Class-I/II (n1, 2) and (2, n2) networks
Example 4. The Class-II (n1, n2) network is equivalent to the Class-II (n2, n1) network. For Class-I networks, the situation
is more subtle. For Class-I/II (2, n2) networks, experiments can show that routing is optimal when n2 ≤ 3. The problem is
still open for the case n2 ≥ 4. In the following, we show that there exists a Class-I (3, 2) network (depicted in Fig. 3), where
routing is not optimal. Consider the following wiretap pattern A = {A1, A2, A3, A4}, where A1 = {1, 2, 4}, A2 = {3, 4},
A3 = {2, 5}, and A4 = {1, 3, 5}. The routing bound is equal to 3. The Shannon bound for Class-I is equal to 2 and for
Class-II is equal to 3. Next, we construct a code to show that 2 is optimal for the Class-I network.
1. Independently generate two bits of key K1 and K2 and one bit of message M from Fq;
2. on edge e1, X1 = K1;
3. on edge e2, X2 =M +K2;
4. on edge e3, X3 = K2;
5. it is easy to see at intermediate node R, (M,K1,K2) can be recovered.
6. on edge e4, X4 =M +K1 +K2;
7. on edge e5, X5 = K1 +K2;
8. at the destination node D, M can be recovered by M = X4 −X5, K1 and K2 cannot be recovered.
The security constraints can be readily verified by the same approach in Examples 1 to 3.
IV. TWO HARD EXAMPLES
In the previous sections, we have already elucidated the differences between Class-I and Class-II wiretap networks. In the
sequel, we focus on the Class-II wiretap networks since the problem may become simpler when K is required to be recovered.
An observation from the experiments in the previous section is that gaps between a lower bound and an upper bound in (16)
exist only if 4 ≤ |A| ≤ 12. For |A| = 4, . . . , 12, the number of wiretap patterns where gaps exist is listed in Table II.
For wiretap patterns in which the routing bounds are not optimal, we have constructed linear coding schemes to achieve the
Shannon bounds by hand. This may be tedious and non-systematic. It is thus of great interest to see whether we can apply
similar techniques to all the remaining unknown cases. When |A| = 4, there are only 18 wiretap patterns, where all the routing
bounds are equal to 3 and Shannon bounds are equal to 2. We can check that Shannon bounds for all these cases can be
achieved by linear coding schemes by the method (Alg. 4) in Sec. III-B. We present a similar coding scheme in Sec. III-C.
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|A| 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
# gaps 18 252 1494 4842 9144 9648 5400 1494 180
TABLE II
THE NUMBER OF WIRETAP PATTERNS WHERE GAPS EXIST IN THE CLASS-II NETWORK
For wiretap patterns where |A| > 4 there are instances for which optimal linear coding schemes are not easy to construct by
hand. Next, we state some wiretap patterns to demonstrate the difficulty of these specific instances.
Example 5. Let A = {A1, A2, A3, A4, A5}, where A1 = {e2, e4, e5}, A2 = {e2, e3, e6}, A3 = {e1, e4, e6}, A4 = {e1, e3, e5},
and A5 = {e1, e2, e4}. The routing bound is equal to 3. By the following constraints, the Shannon bound is equal to 7/3.
3H(K) ≥ 7H(M) (41)
I(M ;K) = 0 (42)
H(X1, X2, X3|M,K) = 0 (43)
H(X4, X5, X6|X1, X2, X3) = 0 (44)
H(M,K|X4, X5, X6) = 0 (45)
I(M ;X2, X4, X5) = 0 (46)
I(M ;X2, X3, X6) = 0 (47)
I(M ;X1, X4, X6) = 0 (48)
I(M ;X1, X3, X5) = 0 (49)
I(M ;X1, X2, X4) = 0 (50)
The following constraints can be added without changing the Shannon bound.
H(X1, X2, X3) = H(X1) +H(X2) +H(X3) (51)
H(X4, X5, X6) = H(X4) +H(X5) +H(X6) (52)
H(X1) = H(X2) (53)
3H(X3) = 4H(X1) (54)
H(X5) = H(X6) (55)
2H(X4) = H(X5) (56)
H(X4|X1, X2, X3) = 0 (57)
H(X5|X1, X3) = 0 (58)
H(X6|X2, X3) = 0 (59)
Since H(K)/H(M) = 7/3, we need to construct a linear code on a vector with size 10 and the bit rates on each edges
from S to R are 3, 3, and 4 and from R to D are 2, 4, and 4, respectively. That is tantamount to a 10 × 10 matrix over Fq.
Except brute force search, we have no other choice at the moment. Since the space of the feasible solutions is huge, optimal
linear coding schemes for this example are unknown.
Next, an even more complicated wiretap pattern with 12 wiretap sets is studied.
Example 6. Let A = {A1, A2, ..., A12}, where A1 = {e3, e5, e6}, A2 = {e3, e4, e6}, A3 = {e3, e4, e5}, A4 = {e2, e5, e6},
A5 = {e2, e4, e6}, A6 = {e2, e3, e6}, A7 = {e2, e3, e5}, A8 = {e2, e3, e4}, A9 = {e1, e5, e6}, A10 = {e1, e3, e5}, A11 =
{e1, e3, e4}, and A12 = {e1, e2, e4, e5}. The routing bound is equal to 4. The Shannon bound is equal to 19/5 by the following
constraints.
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5H(K) ≥ 19H(M) (60)
I(M ;K) = 0 (61)
H(X1, X2, X3|M,K) = 0 (62)
H(X4, X5, X6|X1, X2, X3) = 0 (63)
H(M,K|X4, X5, X6) = 0 (64)
I(M ;X3, X5, X6) = 0 (65)
I(M ;X3, X4, X6) = 0 (66)
I(M ;X3, X4, X5) = 0 (67)
I(M ;X2, X5, X6) = 0 (68)
I(M ;X2, X4, X6) = 0 (69)
I(M ;X2, X3, X6) = 0 (70)
I(M ;X2, X3, X5) = 0 (71)
I(M ;X2, X3, X4) = 0 (72)
I(M ;X1, X5, X6) = 0 (73)
I(M ;X1, X3, X5) = 0 (74)
I(M ;X1, X3, X4) = 0 (75)
I(M ;X1, X2, X4, X5) = 0 (76)
We can show via ITIP/Xitip and hence prove that the Shannon bound is unchanged after adding the following constraints.
H(X1, X2, X3) = H(X1) +H(X2) +H(X3) (77)
H(X4, X5, X6) = H(X4) +H(X5) +H(X6) (78)
7H(X1) = 9H(X2) (79)
8H(X1) = 9H(X3) (80)
3H(X4) = 4H(X5) (81)
5H(X4) = 4H(X6) (82)
H(X4|X1, X2, X3) = 0 (83)
H(X5|X1, X2, X3) = 0 (84)
H(X6|X1, X2, X3) = 0 (85)
Therefore, we need to define a linear coding scheme on a vector with size 24 such that H(K) = 19 and H(M) = 5. Moreover,
the bit rates on the layers from S to R are 9, 7, and 8, and from R to D are 8, 6, and 10, respectively. The functional
relationships between random variables cannot be further refined. Hence, just as in Example 1, we need to split each of
the random variables X1, X2, ..., X6 (say X1 into (X11, X12, ..., X19)), then by ITIP/Xitip, we can obtain more refined
relationships between constituent random variables {Xij}. Due to the number of random variables (i.e., 24), ITIP/Xitip cannot
afford such a huge computation. The linear coding schemes are unknown.
In principle, to find τA, one needs to find upper and lower bounds that match. Since the network model is simple, it is
plausible that the Shannon bound is tight (i.e., it is equal to τA) and linear network coding schemes are sufficient. From these
two examples, we observe that we do not have efficient methods to construct linear coding schemes to achieve their respective
Shannon bounds in general. The only method as of now is to use a brute force search over all the possible linear network
coding schemes over Fq . The computational complexity of such a search is qn
2
, where n is the size of the vector and q is
the field size. In light of the number of the remaining wiretap patterns, it is intractable and computationally prohibitive if we
simply rely on the state-of-the-art resources. Even if we can find a solution by brute force search, such a solution fails to
provide us with an intuitive understanding of the structure of the coding scheme. Thus, one of the take-home messages in this
paper is that information theorists need to construct new techniques and concepts to systematically achieve the Shannon bound
using linear coding schemes. Without such techniques, it is difficult to make progress. To assist the readers of this paper to
investigate the problem further, we have provided the data in [24].
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have defined Class-I/II (n1, n2) wiretap networks and have numerically computed bounds on H(K)/H(M).
The performances of the routing bound on various wiretap patterns have been compared to the cut-set bound and the Shannon
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bound. Examples are constructed to show that under both decoding classes, routing is not sufficient even for a simple (3, 3)
network. Our numerical calculations also demonstrate the differences between Class-I and Class-II networks. Our study shows
that when |A| < 4 or |A| > 12, routing is optimal. Gaps exist in other cases. In the (3, 3) Class-II wiretap network, we can
construct a linear code to achieve the Shannon bound for some wiretap patterns. When 5 ≤ |A| ≤ 12, it is an open problem
to systematically construct optimal linear codes, though we have provided some heuristic rules. A summary on the examples
studied is provided in Table III.
Example 1 Illustrate the basic idea of code construction.
Example 2 Coding beats routing.
Example 3 Class-I Vs. Class-II.
Example 4 (n1, 2) Vs. (2, n2).
Example 5 A hard example where |A| = 5.
Example 6 A hard example where |A| = 12.
TABLE III
A SUMMARY OF ALL THE EXAMPLES
Systematic coding schemes for achieving the Shannon bound are few and far between. One of the stumbling blocks for us
to achieve the Shannon bound is our lack of a complete understanding of information inequalities. By studying the tightness
of the Shannon bounds and their associated coding schemes on some networks with simple topologies, we may gain new
insights that may help us to further understand H(K)/H(M) for general networks. For general Class-I/II (n1, n2) networks,
we have numerically computed all three bounds for all the wiretap patterns for the (n1 = 3, n2 = 3) case. We also list some
wiretap patterns in which the determination of the optimal H(K)/H(M) is challenging. The examples stated in Sec. IV
indicate that the determination of the entropic region of 6 linear vector spaces L˜6 cannot be sidestepped, since the solution of
some complicated wiretap patterns may depend on L˜6 (see Remark 1). Optimistically speaking, we may conjecture that the
Shannon bound is tight in Class-I/II (n1, n2) networks and the bounds can be achieved by linear coding schemes. Resolving
this conjecture is of great interest in information theory. To do so requires us to enhance both the mathematical theory behind
information-theoretic security and to aid in numerical investigations, more sophisticated software will be useful.
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